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1.  Introduction 
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Focus sensitive expressions like "always" and "only" can be argued to express quan-• 
tifier relations with universal force. Thus, like "every", they have a restrictor, and a 
scope. We take the quantificational domain to be a set of events. Focus sensitivity 
manifests itself in the fact that ( 1 )  and (2) each have multiple readings, two of which 
may be approximated as (3) and (4) . The gloss in (3) is presumably what George 
Jean Nathan intended in uttering ( 1 ), and the focus would thus be "to make others 
seem more interesting". 
( 1 )  I only drink to make others seem more interesting. I 
(2) I always drink to make others seem more interesting. 
(3) Every event of drinking by me has making others seem more interesting as 
its goal . 
(4) Every event with the goal of making others seem more interesting involves 
me drinking. 
Herburger (2000) treats "only" and "always" as event quantifiers and makes 
the following generalization : "All the nonfocused material in the scope of the event 
quantifier Q also restricts Q."(Herburger 2000: 1 8) 
We argue that data involving negative polarity items (NPls) bears on the 
question of which material in a sentence with focus sensitive expressions like "al­
ways" and "only" ends up being interpreted in the restrictor. The connection be­
tween focus sensitivity and NPI licensing is as follows: both "always" and "only" 
express forms of universal quantification, and the restrictor of a universal quanti­
fier is standardly recognized as a position licensing a wide range of NPIs. So if 
Herberger is right, then NPIs should be licensed by both "only" and "always". 
On the basis of this argumentation, we will present data in favor of Her­
berger's analysis as it pertains to "only", but against her analysis in regard to "al­
ways". The theoretical importance of this is that it provides reason to believe that 
focus sensitivity results from two different mechanisms, whereas previous authors 
appear to have tacitly assumed that a single mechanism can explain all cases of fo­
cus sensitivity. We will also seek to clarify issues that have arisen in prior studies 
of NPI licensing by "only", in particular building on work of Hom ( 1 996) and von 
Fintel ( 1 999), and will provide a simple formal account which predicts the observed 
NPI licensing data. 
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2. Polarity item licensing and "only" 
We now present naturally occurring and constructed cross-linguistic data showing 
that "only" and its cross-linguistic counterparts license NPIs outside of their focus 
position. This observation (for English) is originally due to Klima ( 1 964) . Subse­
quent discussions of NPI licensing in non-focal positions in the scope of "only" in­
clude Herburger (2000: 1 00- 104), Hom ( 1 996), Ladusaw ( 1 979), Linebarger ( 1 987), 
McCawley ( 1 993 : 83), McCawley ( 1 998 :587), von Fintel ( 1 999) ; cf. , Atlas ( 1 993) ;  
Atlas ( 1 996) . 
NPIs have been divided into two main sub-classes (Zwarts 1 998 ;  Jackson 
1995 ; Krifka 1 995), weak and strong. Weak NPIs in English include unstressed 
"any" and "ever", "care to" and "bother with". Strong NPIs include such locutions 
as "lift a finger" and "give a damn/fuck/shit". The NPIs in these classes are differ­
entiated by their distribution: weak NPIs are standardly taken to be licensed in all 
downward monotone contexts, and (according to Zwarts ( 1 998» strong NPIs are 
licensed in a subset of these contexts having the property of anti-additivity. We 
return to the formal definition of these properties in section 5 .  
Hom ( 1 996:8) claims that "only", although an NPI licenser, does not pro­
duce an anti-additive context and does not license strong NPIs. The data we will 
now present shows that "only" licenses both weak and strong NPIs .  Our study 
differs from previous ones in two ways. First, we concentrate on VP modifying 
"only", studying licensing in non-focal material in the VP. Second, our data is pri­
marily naturally occurring.2 
Examples (5) - ( 14) all illustrate NPI distribution in the scope of VP "only". 
In each case, the relevant occurrence of "only" has been underlined, and the NPI 
has been boxed. The first four examples illustrate weak NPIs, and the remainder 
strong NPIs. In all of these cases, the NPI is not the focus of "only". 
(5) We only I ever I had cream of mushroom.3 
(6) The central problem is that it is only I ever I possible to sample a child's lan­
guage over a fixed period of time and within a finite number of situations.4 
(7) Because we found one order of this group to be much more likely than any 
other, we probably only I care to I see the map distances for this single order.5 
(8) According to his viewpoint, the Miatas are prone to this partly because they 
don't accumulate miles the way most cars do. The timing belt should be 
changed at 60,000 miles OR 60 months, and most people only I bother with I 
the mileage.6 
--
(9) The only words coming out of my mouth is a lyrical thang 
So please back tha fuck up off my screen tho 
Since i was four you was known to be the enemy 
Like rintintin you only give a shit for me 
The community took four steps 19her 
86ing motherfuckas working for the suppliers 7 
4 1  
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( 1 0) . . .  if the left flipper is too weak for a bearkick, as it of ten is because people 
who run arcades are usually assholes and only ' give a shit ' about their street 
fighter shit games, use that left flipper to send the ball back into the swamp.8 
( 1 1 )  Well, I certainly don't  give a damn. I only ' gave a damn ' because I thought 
you did.9 
( 1 2) If you were a kid in Cleveland (then), you only ' gave a damn ' about two 
things - the Beatles and Ghoulardi . 1 0 
( 1 3) Work is the curse of Stevie Thomas Jackson and Christopher Thomas Ged­
des. Stuart David, visionary and poet, cursed it before trying it, and would 
only ' lift a finger ' to pick his nose or write a book. I I  
( 14) You may think faeries are sweet, good and kind, but they're not. They're 
vicious, greedy buggers who'd only lift a finger to save their best friend if 
they thought they'd profit from it. T ey ave s arp teeth too and, as many 
people have found out, won't hesitate to use them. 1 2  
We have not collected large amounts of data on NPI licensing of  cognates of 
"only" in languages other than English. However, our initial research on other lan­
guages is encouraging . 1 3  In Dutch, cognates of "only" also license NPls. van der 
Wal ( 1 996) mentions "aIleen maar" and "slechts" as members of a class of "in­
herently negative" expressions which license NPls. Zwarts ( 1 998: 1 95) classifies 
phrases of the form "slechts n N" and "alleen NP" as monotone decreasing, like 
their English counterparts "only n N" and "only NP", respectively. 
Using web searches, we located several naturally occurring examples of 
Dutch cognates of "only" licensing NPls. Note that, with the possible exception 
( 1 7) ,  these are not VP-modifying uses of cognates of "only". 
( 1 5) Negative Polarity Item licensing by "maar" : "enig benul" [Dutch] 
Spreker vindt dat het multicultureel erfgoed niet be staat. Er volgens hem 
maar een spreker, die , enig benul l heeft van Vlaamse identiteit. . .  14 
"Speaker finds that the multi-cultural inheritance does not exist. In his view, 
[there is] only one speaker who has ' any notion I of the Flemish identity." 
( 1 6) Negative Polarity Item licensing by "slechts": "enig benul" [Dutch] 
Waarschi · nlijk is het altijd al zo geweest dat slechts een kleine minderheid 
enig benul heeft van de methoden en resultaten van de wetenschap. 1 5  
"Probably i t  has always been the case that only a small minority has any 
notion of the methods and results of science." 
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( 1 7) Negative Polarity Item licensing by "aileen": "kan evenaren" 
[Dutch] 
De motor is wonderlijk sterk en klein . Als we een bacterie opblazen tot 
de afmetingen van een auto heeft zijn motor een doorsnee van slechts vijf 
centimeter - een verhouding tussen kracht en afmetingen die onze techniek 
aIleen met gasturbines en raketten 1 kan evenaren 1. 16 
"The motor is wonderfully strong and small .  If we blew up a bacterium to 
the size of a car, it's motor would only be 5 centimeters across - a power 
to weight ratio with which in our technology only gas turbines and rockets 1 can compare V' -
A native Dutch informant reports that the following constructed example in 
which VP "aIleen maar" licenses the NPI "ooit" 'ever' is acceptable: 
( 1 8) Negative Polarity Item licensing by "aileen maar" : "ooit" 
Jan heeft 1 ooit 1 aIleen maar geld aan zijn  [moeder]F gegeven. 
"Jan only I ever I gave money to his [mother]F ." 
[Dutch] 
We have also found some initiaI evidence that "nur", the German cognate 
of "only", licenses NPls, on the basis of native speaker judgments of the following 
constructed examples: 
( 1 9) Negative Polarity Item licensing by "nur" : "einen Muckser von sich 
gegeben" [German] 
Hans hat nur in dem [haus]F 1 einen Muckser von sich gegeben I. 
"Hans only made 1 so much as a peep 1 in the [house]F ." 
As a last NPI example, we found the following case of "solamente" ' only ' 
licensing an NPI in Spanish:  
(20) Negative Polarity Item licensing by "solamente": "dijo una palabra" 
[Spanish] 
Solamente una himpara 1 dijo una palabra 1 
y me condujo a salva hasta la habitaci6n 1 7 
"Only a lamp said a word 
And led me in safety up to our quarters" 
43 
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2. 1 .  NPI licensing in the focus of "only " 
The scope of "every" does not license NPls, so if "only" is akin to a universal as 
suggested, we would expect that NPls would not be permitted in the focus position 
of "only". However, Linebarger ( 1 987) and Hom ( 1 996:27f) provide constructed 
examples showing that the NPls "any" and "ever" are licensed in the focus position 
of "only". The example in (2 1 )  is from Linebarger ( 1 987 : 373) .  
(2 1 )  "Only" licensing NPI "ever" in focal position 
Only people who have I ever I had a debilitating illness themselves can ap­
preciate what an ordeal this was. 
Note that (2 1 )  is also acceptable without "only" « 22)) :  
(22) Bare plural licensing NPI "ever" in focal position 
People who have I ever I had a debilitating illness themselves can appreciate 
what an ordeal this was. 
It is easy to find naturally occurring examples of bare plural and definite 
wh-clauses licensing NPls to which you can freely add "only". 
(23) Definite wh-clause licensing NPI "any" 
a. In fact, among the 30.4 million U.S . adults who made I any I purchase via 
the Web in the past month, one out of 1 1  reads PC World. I S  
b. "In fact, among only the 30.4 million U.S.  adults who made.J¢nrJ pur­
chase via the Web in the past month, one out of 1 1  reads PC or ." 
(24) Bare plural licensing NPI "ever" 
a. People who had I ever I been heavy marijuana users cost the nation $34.2 
billion in diminished worker productivity in 1 980. 19 
b. Only people who had I ever I been heavy marijuana users cost the nation 
$34.2 billion in diminished worker productivity in 1 980. 
So Linebarger's ( 1 987) and Hom's ( 1 996) data do not show that "only" 
licenses weak NPls in its focus position, merely that independently licensed NPls 
may appear there, which is unsurprising. As Hom ( 1 996:28) puts it: "polarity items 
are possible in this context [the focus position of "only" - DIBIBZC] not because of 
the semantic properties of only but in spite of them". 
Further, note that certain NPs which mark the lowest points on scales are li­
censed in the focus of "only"; e.g.,  "She only drank a [drop ]F". In such cases "only" 
has a scalar reading rather than an exhaustive reading. We posit that whenever a 
phrasal NPI is licensed in the focus of "only", it has a referential interpretation, 
derived compositionally, putting it on the endpoint of a scale, rather than a purely 
conventional non-compositional interpretation. For example, "Did Mary have any 
whiskey?" can be followed by "She only drank [a drop]F ! ".  This reply would only 
be a true statement if there is some drop of whiskey that Mary drank. Further, it is  
possible to say "She drank a whole drop !",  which exploits the compositional nature 
of the NPI. 
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3. "Always" and polarity item licensing 
Neither corpus searches in the British National Corpus, nor corpus searches in ten 
years of the New York Times, nor web searches produced any credible examples of 
the six NPls from (5) - ( 14) in positions licensed by an occurrence of "always" (or 
"usually") in the same clause.2o Furthermore, replacement of "only" by "always" 
in sentences involving NPls produces infelicity, even after appropriate adjustments 
have been made. Witness the effects of replacing "only" by "always" in variants of 
(5) - ( 1 4) :  
(25) People only/*always ever have [cream of mushroom SOUP]F .2 1 
(26) It is only/*always ever possible to sample a child's  language over [a fixed 
period of time]F. 
(27) We probably only/?always care to see the map distances for [this single 
order]F .  
(28) People only/?always bother with [the mileage]F .  
(29) People only/?always give a shit for [me]F .  
(30) People only/?always give a shit about [street fighter games]F . 
(3 1 )  I only/?always gave a damn because I thought [you did]F .  
(32) If you were a kid in Cleveland, you only/*always gave a damn about [two 
things]F .  
(33) Stuart would only/?always lift a finger to [pick his nose]F or [write a book]F .  
(34) Faeries would only/?always lift a finger to [save their best friend]F.  
Cross-linguistic counterparts of "always" also seem not to license NPls. 
Neither van der Wal ( 1 996) nor Zwarts ( 1 998) list any cognates of "always" as 
NPI licensors in Dutch. Further, while we have found some initial evidence that 
"nur", the German cognate of "only", licenses NPls (see example ( 1 9», "immer" 
'always' does not, on the basis of native speaker judgments of the example in (35 ) :  
(35) Negative Polarity Item licensing by "immer" : "einen Muckser von sich 
gegeben" [German] 
? Hans hat immer in dem [haus]F 1 einen Muckser von sich gegeben I. 
"Hans always made 1 so much as a peep 1 in the [house]F ." 
Note that NPls are licensed in adjunct sub-clauses serving as explicit restric­
tors for "always", as shown in examples (36-38) .  Although we have not studied the 
issue of which NPls are licensed in explicit restrictors of "always", it is clear that 
there is a disparity between licensing of NPls in this position, and licensing of NPls 
within non-focused material within the main clause. 
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(36) At any place I've I ever I worked, I was always ' ' 'Joey-on-the-Spot' ' .22 
(37) They have always been great for customer service and if there is I ever I a 
problem they always make you the winner.23 
(38) If we I care to I listen, we can always hear them.24 
4. PPI licensing 
It is natural to ask whether the distribution of positive polarity items (PPls; e.g. ,  
"rather", "pretty", "quite") differs between "only" and "always". The parallel with 
"every" would lead to the negative prediction that PPls should not be licensed in 
the scope of "only" and "always" outside of the focus. However, as the following 
examples show, once again there is a contrast between "only" and "always": PPls 
are licensed in non-focal positions in the scope of "always", but not "only". 
(39) Positive Polarity Item 
a. Mary's ?only/always rather tired on [SundaY]F. 
b. Mary's ?only/always pretty (damn) tired on [SundaY]F .  
Corpus searches for PPls have not been revealing. However, (40) is an 
example which is ambiguous as to whether the PPI "quite" occurs in the focus 
of "always" or not. The fact that the phrase "always been quite useful" can be read 
without stress provides some further support for our claim that PPls are licensed 
in non-focal positions in the scope of "always". We have found no such examples 
invol ving "only". 
(40) PPI "quite" licensed by "always" 
Traditional economics has always been I quite I useful for understanding the 
market forces that shaped industries and governed competition among firms 
during the first and second revolutions.25 
5. Monotonicity Inferences 
The notion of mono tonicity relates to inferential properties of parts of sentences .  
Material that can be arbitrarily strengthened while maintaining truth of the sen­
tence is said to occur in a downward monotone position. We will be presenting 
our account of the semantics of "only" and "always" in terms of a simple logic, 
and for this system it is natural to understand downward monotonicity in terms of 
substitution of sub-formulae. If Q' is a sub-formula of </J, then we write the result of 
replacing Q' with the conjunction of Q' and {3 as </J[ Q' / Q' 1\ }3] ,  producing the following 
definition : 
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Definition 1 (Test for (simple) downward monotonicity) The expression 0 occurs 
in a simply downward monotone position in a sentence </> iff or any (3 which is 
stronger than 0, </> entails </>[0/(3] . If 0 is a set denoting term, then a stronger term 
would be a narrower one, i.e. one denoting a subset. If 0 is a proposition, then 
strength means logical strength, so (3 ranges over expressions that entail 0, e.g. a 
conjunction containing 0 as one conjunct. 
It is widely accepted that downward monotonicity is a necessary condition 
for licensing of NPls (Fauconnier 1 975 ; Ladusaw 1 979), although see Giannakidou 
( 1 998) for an alternative view. Similarly, upward monotonicity, i .e .  the validity 
of inferences involving weakening, is widely held to be a necessary condition for 
licensing of positive polarity items. 
Definition 2 (Test for upward monotonicity) The expression 0 occurs in an up­
ward monotone position in a sentence </> iff or any (3 which is weaker than 0, </> 
entails </>[0/(3] . 
Universal quantifier relations have a downward monotonic argument, the 
restrictor, and an upward monotonic argument, the scope. As a result, Negative 
Polarity Items (NPls) are licensed in the restrictor but not the scope. The example 
in (4 1 )  shows licensing of the NPI "ever": 
(4 1 )  a. Every bear that ever there was i s  going to be down i n  the woods be­
cause . . . .  26 
b. * Every bear is ever going to be down in the woods. 
As stated in the introduction, we take "only" to express a universal, fol­
lowing argumentation of Hom ( 1 996), who himself cites medieval authority for his 
position. On Hom's account "Only As are Bs" is logically equivalent to "All Bs 
are As". Since "All Bs are As" is downward monotone in the B position, "Only 
As are Bs" should be downward monotone in the B position. Assuming a uniform 
semantics for NP and VP "only", non-focal material in the syntactic scope of VP 
"only" should also license NPls. This is in complete agreement with the data we 
presented above. 
Is the data from NPI licensing backed up by inference tests based on defini­
tion 1 1  Unfortunately, the answer is no. In the following example, the diagnostic 
for downward monotonicity fails, since the validity of the argument from (42a) to 
the strengthened (42b) is dubious. 
(42) a. Only Nathan drank to make others seem more interesting. [ -+ 1] 
b. Only Nathan drank mojitos to make others seem more interesting. 
Von Fintel, as well as presenting an example like (42) showing failure of the 
monotonicity inference for NP "only", also notes that strengthening non-focal ma­
terial in the scope of VP "only" is not clearly truth preserving. Thus, for example, 
it is not clear that (43b) can be inferred from (43a) . 
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(43) a. Nathan only drank [to make others seem more interesting]F . [-+ ?] 
b. Nathan only drank mojitos [to make others seem more interesting]F .  
More generally, i t  has been observed by Ladusaw ( 1 979) and others (see 
e.g. , Linebarger ( 1 987)) that NPIs are licensed in many cases where strengthening 
inferences do not appear to hold. Apart from "only", examples of constructions 
which license NPIs but do not cleanly support monotonicity inferences include 
emotive factives, superlatives and embedded questions. 
von Fintel ( 1 999) discusses a variant of downward monotonicity which is a 
better predictor of NPI licensing. In partial adoption of von Fintel 's  terminology, we 
term this Strawson downward monotonicity. We arrive at the following diagnostic: 
Definition 3 (Test for Strawson downward monotonicity) Let presupposition( 'ljJ) 
be the strongest sentence presupposed by 'ljJ. The expression a occurs in a Strawson 
downward monotone position in a sentence </J iff or any (3 which is stronger than 
a, the combination of </J and presupposition( </J[O'j (3] ) entails </J[O'j (3] . 
The idea is that "only Nathan drank to make others seem more interesting" 
entails "only Nathan drank mojitos to make others seem more interesting", under 
the assumption that the presuppositions of the second are satisfied. 
On the analysis we will follow, that of Hom ( 1 996), the presuppositions 
connected with "only" are existential, i .e. in this case the presupposition is that 
someone drank moj itos to make others seem more interesting. Note that strength­
ening the presupposition to "Nathan drank moj itos to make others seem more in­
teresting", in accord with Hom ( 1 969), would not affect our account, although as 
Hom ( 1 996) clearly shows, it is less motivated. 
With the von Fintel inspired revision of the downward monotonicity diag­
nostic, we can show for NP and VP "only" that downward monotonicity inferences 
are valid. From (44/45a,b), we can infer (44/45c). 
(44) Downward monotonicity: "only NP" 
a. Someone drank mojitos to make others seem more interesting. 
b. Only Nathan drank to make others seem more interesting. [ -+ ] 
c .  Only Nathan drank mojitos to make others seem more interesting. 
(45) Downward monotonicity: "only VP" 
a. Nathan drank mojitos (for some reason) .  
b. Nathan only drank [to make others seem more interesting]F . [  -+] 
c .  Nathan only drank mojitos [to make others seem more interesting]F .  
A function is anti-additive iff i t  is downward monotonic and when the func­
tion holds of two sets, it also holds of their union. For example, take the function 
from properties "X" to "No X is 300 years old". From the conjunction of "No 
woman is 300 years old" and "No man is 300 years old", we can infer "No man or 
woman is 300 years old". 
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Definition 4 (Test for (simple) anti-additivity) The expression 0 occurs in an 
anti-additive position in a sentence 4> iff 4> and 4>[0/ J3] are together equivalent to 
4>[0/0 or J3]Y 
It is easily seen that the restrictor of "every" is  anti-additive. Not only does 
the inference from (46b) to (46a) go through (downward monotonicity), but also the 
inference from (46a) to (46b) is valid. (Here 0 is "girl", J3 is "boy".) For an example 
of a non-anti-additive context, consider the the restrictor of "less than three" :  note 
that there is a valid (downward monotonicity) inference from (46d) to (46c), but not 
vice versa. 
(46) Anti-Additivity: "every" and "less" 
a. Every girl is happy and every boy is happy. [f-*] 
b. Every girl or boy is happy. 
c .  Less than three girls are happy and less than three boys are happy. [1+] 
d. Less than three boys or girls are happy. 
Hom ( 1 996:8) claims that "Only NP", although a polarity licenser, is a non­
anti-additive quantifier. If "only" is semantically equivalent to a universal, as Hom 
argues at length, and if universal restrictors are anti-addititive, then Hom is incorrect 
to say that non-focal material in the scope of "only" occurs in a non-anti-additive 
context. But perhaps part of the problem is that presupposition complicates the data 
we obtain using the standard inference test for anti-additivity. 
As with the the superset inference test for downward entailment, a sentence 
"Only Nathan drank mojitos and only Nathan drank Cajun martinis" is equivalent 
to "Only Nathan drank mojitos or Cajun martinis" only if all presuppositions are 
satisfied. Accordingly, we modify the definition of anti-additivity : 
Definition 5 (Test for Strawson anti-additivity) The expression 0 occurs in an 
anti-additive position in a sentence 4> iff 4> and 4>[0/ J3] are together equivalent to 
the combination of 4>[0/ 0 or J3], the presuppositions of 4> and the presuppositions 
of 4>[0/ J3] . 
Note that for cases that occur to us, if the presuppositions of 4> and those 
of 4>[0/ J3] are satisfied, then the presuppositions of 4>[0/ 0 or J3] will also be sat­
isfied. So it is not necessary to add presuppositions to the lefthand-side of the 
bi-implication in the above definition. 
There is a bi-implication between (a,b) and (c,d,e) in each of (47) and (48), 
showing that both NP and VP "only" produce Strawson anti-additive contexts out­
side of their foci. Note that this result corroborates the analysis of "only" as a 
universal quantifier.28 
(47) Strawson anti-additivity: "only NP" 
a. Only Nathan drank to make others seem more interesting, and 
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b. only Nathan smoked to make others seem more interesting. [++] 
c.  Only Nathan drank or smoked to make others seem more interesting, 
d. someone drank to make others seem more interesting and 
e. someone smoked to make others seem more interesting. 
(48) Strawson anti-additivity: "only VP" 
a. Nathan only drank [to make others seem more interesting]F ,  and 
b. Nathan only smoked [to make others seem more interesting]F .  [++] 
c. Nathan only drank or smoked [to make others seem more interesting]F ,  
d. Nathan drank and 
e. Nathan smoked. 
The combination of NPI licensing data and inference test data allows us 
to refute some analyses of "only" which do not account for presuppositions ade­
quately. For example, the cross-categorial analysis of "only" presented by Bonomi 
and Casalegno ( 1 993) incorporates as a principal part of the meaning of "only" what 
we (and Hom) give as an existential presupposition. In Bonomi and Casalegno's  
( 1 993) event framework "Sandy only eats [nuts]F" has a meaning (3eeating(e) 1\ 
AGENT(e) = sandy 1\ THEME = nuts) 1\ (Ve eating(e) 1\ AGENT(e) = sandy -+ 
THEME = nuts) . That analysis predicts that non-focussed material in the scope of 
NP and VP only is in a non-monotone context, neither upward monotonic nor sim­
ply downward monotonic nor Strawson downward monotonic . This is incompatible 
with either the NPI data presented earlier, or the inference test data presented in this 
section.29 
To end this section, let us consider monotonicity inferences involving "al­
ways". Our observation here is that monotonicity inferences involving "always" are 
far less clear than those involving "only", having a will 0' the wisp character. In 
some cases, it seems clear that "always" creates a Strawson downward monotonic 
context in non-focal material : 
(49) a. Nathan sometimes drank mojitos, 
b. Nathan always drank [to make others seem more interesting]F . [  -+]  
c .  Nathan always drank mojitos [to make others seem more interesting]F .  
However, consider the contrast between (50) and (5 1 ) . Whereas the mono­
tonicity inference in (50) is clear, there is no clear inference from (5 I a,b) to (S I c) .  
On the contrary, i t  seems possible to infer (S I b) from (S I c) ,  indicating an upward 
monotonic context. 
(50) a. Kids care deeply about something these days. 
b. Kids only care about [musiclF these days. [-+] 
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c.  Kids only care deeply about [music]F these days. 
(5 1 )  a. Kids care deeply about something these days. 
b. Kids always care about [music]F these days. [ --+ 1] 
c. Kids always care deeply about [music]F these days. 
Perhaps the explanation of this puzzling result is that stress in (5 1b,c) is 
taken to mark broad focus on "care (deeply) about music", in which case we would 
be observing inferences involving focal material . But it is not clear why this should 
not also be the case for the parallel sentences involving "only" in (50), and we 
have no basis for claiming that focus projection in the scope of "only" should work 
differently from focus projection in the scope of "always". On the basis of the NPI 
licensing data we presented earlier, we take a different tack. 
We suppose that while compositional semantics causes non-focal material 
in the scope of NP or VP "only" to be interpreted in the restrictor of a universal , 
the mechanism determining the restrictor of "always" (when that restrictor is not 
explicit) is pragmatic. Thus non-focal material in a sentence containing "always" is 
not interpreted in the restrictor of a universal . Rather, this material gets interpreted 
in the universal 's scope, and NPIs are not licensed there since it is not a (Strawson) 
downward monotone context. Indeed, it is upward monotone. The variability of 
inference data involving sentences with "always" would then be explained by the 
fact that the formation of the restrictor of "always" does not result from an orderly 
grammatical process, but from pragmatic reasoning. 
6. A Formal Account 
In this section we describe our proposal for the semantics of "only" and "always", 
show formally how "only" and "always" differ in terms of downward monotonicity 
and anti-additivity, and hence account for the polarity item licensing behavior that 
we have observed. 
We use a three-valued logic, first order predicate logic with the addition of 
one propositional operator, the presupposition operator 8 of (Beaver 200 1 ) .30 The 
existential and universal quantifiers have classical satisfaction conditions and, for 
simplicity, 3<p and V<p are false if not true. The connectives are Weak Kleene; i .e . ,  
defined iff all arguments are defined, and classical in this case. The presupposition 
operator produces undefinedness when its argument is not true, and is defined as 
follows: 
Definition 6 (Presupposition operator) [84>DM = 1 iff [4>DM = 1 , = * otherwise. 
We next give a logical reformulation of the downward monotonicity diag­
nostics. 
Definition 7 (Simple downward monotonicity) A formula a occurs in a simply 
downward monotone position in 4> iff or any 13 such that 13 1== a, 4> 1== 4> [a/f3] . 
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Thus, for example, the subformula bark(fido) is in a simply downward 
monotone position in -,bark(fido) , since classically -,bark(fido) F -, ( bark(fido) 1\ 
¢) for any ¢. 
The following presupposition sensitive notion of entailment differs from 
classical entailment in that it is restricted to models in which both premises and 
conclusion are defined, i .e . their presuppositions are satisfied: 
Definition 8 (Strawson Entailment) ¢1 , . . .  ¢i IF 'I/J iff 
VM if [¢l ]M = . . .  = [¢i]M = 1 and ['I/J]M E {a ,  I } then ['I/J]M = 1 
Relative to this presupposition sensitive notion of entailment, we can easily 
define what it means to be in a Strawson downward monotonic position or Strawson 
anti-additive position. 
Definition 9 (Strawson downward monotonicity) Aformula 0 occurs in a Straw­
son downward monotone position in ¢ iff or any (3 such that (3 IF 0, ¢ IF ¢[o/ (3] . 
Definition 10 (Strawson anti-additivity) A formula 0 occurs in a Strawson anti­
additive position in ¢ iff 0 is in a Strawson downward monotone position in ¢ and 
for any (3, ¢ 1\ ¢[o/ (3] IF ¢[% V (3] . 
We now proceed to the semantics of "only" and "always". We define the 
semantics of these two operators as uniformly as possible, so as to highlight rele­
vant differences. We assume both words to be universal quantifier relations defined 
between sets of events, and both words to carry a presupposition that the quantifica­
tional restrictor is a non-empty set. A presuppositional universal quantifier relation 
may be defined in our partial logic as follows: 
Definition 11  (Presuppositional universal operator) 
[2]( ¢, 'I/J) =def 8(3e¢) 1\ Ve(  ¢ -+ 'I/J). 
Now let SUB be the content of the subject NP in a sentence, NF be the 
content of the non-focal material in the VP, and F be the content of the focal material 
in the VP. Then the interpretation of a sentence containing VP "only" is given as 
follows: 
Definition 12 (Semantics of "only") 
"NP only VP" translates to [2](SUB 1\ NF) (F) 
For example, in the sentence "Mary only has a [lamb ]F", the variables would 
be set as follows: SUB is AGENT(e)=m; NF is POSSEssION(e) ; F is 3 x (lamb(x) 1\ 
THEME(e) = x) . Thus the meaning of the sentence would be (52). 
(52) [2](AGENT(e)=m I\POSSEssION(e» (3 x (lamb(x) 1\ THEME(e) = x » 
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This formula presupposes that there is some event possession by Mary, and 
asserts that every such event is one in which the object possessed is a lamb. 
One crucial difference between "only" and "always" explains the polarity li­
censing contrasts we have presented. Whereas the restrictor of "only" is constrained 
by non-focal material, the restrictor of "always", in the absence of an explicit re­
strictive subordinate clause, is provided by context. Let a be a contextually given 
property of events .  Then we interpret sentences containing "always" as follows: 
Definition 13 (Semantics of "always") 
"NP always VP " translates to ffi a )(SUB /\ NF /\ F) 
Thus the compositionally derived meaning of "Mary always has a [lamb ]F" 
would be (53) .  
(53) [j(a)(AGENT(e)=m /\ POSSEs sION(e)/\ 3 x (iamb(x) /\ THEME(e) = x )) 
Questions arise as to how a should be resolved, and how its resolution 
should be related to focus. Here we do not answer these questions, and merely 
make the claim that a is resolved pragmatically, and not compositionally. 
Note that the above meanings for "only" and "always" differ not only in the 
restrictor position, but also in the scope, i .e. the second arp!;ment of the universal 
operator. However, this difference is superficial .  Since �(SUB /\ NF) (F) -
[2J(SUB /\ NF) (SUB /\ NF/\F) ,  we could equally well have written out the meanings 
for "only" and "always" such that the scope of the quantifier was the same in both 
cases, i .e. SUB /\ NF /\ F. 
Let us assume that weak NPls are licensed in Strawson downward monotone 
positions and strong NPls are licensed in Strawson anti-additive positions. The 
following easily proven fact is now derivable from the above definitions and predicts 
the NPI licensing data presented earlier. 
FACT NF is in a Strawson Downward Entailing and Strawson Anti-additive posi­
tion in the translation of "NP only VP", but NF is not in a Strawson Down­
ward Entailing or (a fortiori) in a Strawson Anti-additive position in the 
translation of "NP always VP". 
7. Discussion 
The monotonicity data we have examined in this paper supports the hypothesis 
that non-focal material in the scope of "only" is interpreted in the restrictor of a 
universal . Concerning "always", the data discussed so far is puzzling. Standard 
examples of focus sensitivity show that there is a correlation between unfocussed 
material and the adverb's semantic restrictor. Yet we have presented evidence that 
in simple sentences involving "always", unfocussed material is not interpreted in 
the restrictor of a universal . 
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In other work (Beaver and Clark submitted; Beaver and Clark 2002; Beaver 
and Clark in prep), we discuss a range of phenomena which support the analysis 
we have given. One of these phenomena is a converse effect to the one we have 
concentrated on here: whereas stressed material in the scope of "only" becomes the 
semantic focus of the operator, sometimes "always" does not associate with stressed 
material in its scope. Rather, the restrictor of "always" is determined contextually, 
often producing an effect that has been described, e .g .  by Rooth ( 1 999), as associ­
ation with presupposition; for the original observation, see Schubert and Pelletier 
( 1 987); Schubert and Pelletier ( 1 989) . We conclude with an example showing the 
effect for "always", and the absence of the effect for "only". 
The example, (54), is drawn from a British newspaper, and concerns the 
sport of rugby. Various readings are available. It is possible to understand the 
subject "a prop forward" as the semantic focus of "always". What is notable is 
that this reading is obtained even if the example is read with stress on "brunt" and 
"punishment", but not on "prop forward". Here, what is presupposed is a set of 
high-speed collisions, from which punishment will necessarily follow, and from 
which some group of players will bear the brunt. Against this background, we 
learn the identity of the unfortunate recipients of the punishment, namely the prop 
forwards. 
(54) It's a high-speed collision sport and a prop forward always takes the brunt 
of the punishment.3 1 
A reading of this sort is not available in (55) .  The reading that we obtain, 
with stress on "brunt" and "punishment", is that a prop forward does not take the 
brunt of anything apart from the punishment. This is presumably true, but we are 
not sure what it means. 
(55) A prop forward only takes the [brunt of the punishment]F .  
Endnotes 
IGeorge Jean Nathan, below his picture in Charley O's, 2 1 4  W. 45th St., New York 
City. 
2 Some possible counterexamples to the licensing of strong NPIs by "only" are given 
by Atlas ( 1 996) (and also in recent unpublished work), involving the NPIs "until", 
"all that keen" and "a red cent". Regarding "a red cent", we find it difficult to find 
reliable informants. But regarding "until" and "all that keen", we are in agreement 
with Atlas' jugements. Note also that these items are licensed in canonical negative 
contexts, as in "Nobody left until Sunday" or "Nobody was all that keen to leave". 
Crucially, however, these items do not sit well in the restrictor of "every". For 
example "Everybody that left until Sunday returned" is quite odd, as is "Everybody 
that was all that keen to leave returned". We conclude that the licensing conditions 
for these operators must go beyond those available in the restrictor of a universal , 
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and thus that these items perhaps form part of a distinct class of NPls with their 
own licensing properties. Whatever the licensing conditions of "until" and "all that 
keen", it seems unlikely that they can provide evidence either for or against our 
claims about "only". 
3Muriel Gray, Thefirstfifty, Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1 990. 
4 John Harris, Early language development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1 990. 
5Stephen Lincoln, Mark Daly and Eric Lander, Constructing Genetic Linkage Maps 
with MAPMAKERlEXP Version 3.0: A Tutorial and Reference Manual, Whitehead 
Institute for Biomedical Research Technical Report, January, 1 993.  
6ht tp : / / www . socalm . org / c rank / crank1 9 9 6 0 9  . pt l . html - archived email. 
7The Coup, "Interrogation", on Genocide and Juice, Wild PitchlEMI Records, 1 994 
(CD). 
8 h t tp : / / www . ac c . umu . s e / o s c ar / pi nba l l / gbook / gu e s tbook . html - )\ page 
for pinball lovers. 
9Jamie Malankowski, "Five Finales :  How to wrap up Seinfeld? We offer some 
suggestions", Time Magazine 1 5 1 : 1 7, May 4 1 998 .  Note: we take it that in this 
example the focus of "only" is the "because" clause although "gave" would also be 
read with contrastive stress to mark the past tense morpheme. 
lOMike Olszewski, quoted in the Akron Beacon Journal, October 9, 1 998 .  
l lBelle and Sebastian, /f You 're Feeling Sinister (CD Sleeve Notes), Jeepster 1 996. 
1 20nline text at h t tp : / /www . ange l f i re . c om / me / Spero / f o l ks . html . 
13)\n exception is Hebrew, for which in initial work we found no evidence of "rak" 
("only") licensing NPls. The languages for which we have positive data are all 
Romance or Germanic. 
14De heer Raets, quoted in the minutes of the meeting of the Provincieraad van 
)\ntwerpen, October 1998. 
15Maarten van Rossem, Geloof en Wetenschap, September 1 999. Note first that 
"minderheid" ("minority") could also be the relevant NPI licensor. Second, there 
is an occurrence of "altijd" ("always") in the first clause. However, the NPI falls 
clearly in the semantic scope of "altijd", not its restrictor, so this is  presumably 
irrelevant. 
16"Bouwen in een kleine wereld", KIJK. 
17  Benjamfn Valdivia, "Sobre un afortunado papel de fotograffa", in El Juego del 
TIempo. Secretarfa de Educaci6n Publica / CRE)\ Mexico, 1 985 .  
18http : / /market ing . pcwo r l d . c om/ s i te / pres s re l eas e s / f a l l 2 0 0 1mr i . html 
19Ed Falk, Lies in the war on drugs, repost from mi s c . ac t ivi sm . progr e s s ive, 
1/251 1 993. 
2oHowever, we do find examples of "any" and its variants ("anything", etc.) in VPs 
modified by "always". It seems that we are forced to regard "any" as exceptional . 
This, of course, is not an unusual move. There is a large literature attempting to 
explain the distribution facts of "any", much of which simply assumes that "any" 
is ambiguous between NPI and so-calledfree-choice readings - see Kadmon and 
Landman ( 1 993) and Krifka ( 1 995) for attempts to do without this ambiguity. 
2 1The impossibility of "always" and "ever" in (25) could result from a mismatch 
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between the temporal interpretations of "always" and "ever", and have nothing to do 
with polarity per se. However, "never ever" is felicitous, suggesting that the issue is 
one of mono tonicity not temporality. Note also that there are positive uses of "ever", 
meaning roughly "forever": these are common in the scope of "always", generally 
as a form of emphasis . Ideally a diagnostic should be developed to separate positive 
and negative uses of "ever". 
22Joe Greenwood, "Eye of the Storm: Taking It Easy", AIDS Survival Project: A 
coalition of people affected by HIV, Atlanta, 1 999. 
23 P.M., Miami, Florida, as recorded on the Arts and Letters Corporation web pages. 
24W.H. Auden, In Time of War: Commentary. 
25David Evans and Matthew Leder, "Economics for the Third Industrial Revolu­
tion", Viewpoint 1 ,  Marsh and McLennan Companies, 1 999. 
26James B .  Kennedy, The Teddy Bear 's Picnic, 1 9 1 3 .  (Tune composed John W. 
Bratton, 1 907, presumably inspiring use of an NPI.) 
27 Note that the leftward direction of this bi-implication is equivalent to downward 
monotonicity, since a is just a strengthening of a or {3, and so is {3.  
28Note that Atlas ( 1 996) argues that "only Count Noun" is a downward monotonic, 
anti-additive quantifier expression, while "only Proper Name" is a non-monotonic, 
pseudo-anti-additive quantifier expression. We would claim that neither "only Count 
Noun" nor "only Proper Name" are simply downward monotonic, and, a fortiori, 
neither are simply anti-additivity. We would also claim that both are Strawson anti­
additive and, a fortiori, both are Strawson downward monotonic . 
29The question arises as to whether "every" creates an anti-additive context, or 
merely a Strawson anti-additive context. Note that many people would be queasy 
about the equivalence of "Every American head of state has been male." and "Every 
American president has been male and every American monarch has been male.", 
even under the assumption that all heads of state are either presidents or monarchs. 
So perhaps we should say that "every", like "only", creates a Strawson anti-additive 
context. 
30We treat presupposition in a partial logic because of the formal simplicity of this 
approach, although nothing hinges on it. For a compositional account of presuppo­
sition in partial logic, see Beaver and Krahmer (2001 ) .  
31The Daily Mirror, Mirror Group Newspapers, London 1 992. 
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